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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

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ATTNG-64 350.05/41(DOC)(C)(14 Mar 52)

14 March 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

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FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

1 Incl

Extracts from sources
279 thru 308

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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

SOURCE:

Command Report - 31st FA Bn

DATE:

November 1951

Source No 279

PLOTTING ARTILLERY FIRE MISSIONS

A great majority of the observed fire missions fired by this Battalion are fired by Air Observers. It has been the experience of this Battalion that the firing is speeded up considerably, if, after the initial data is plotted on the chart, and range and deflection read therefrom, the remainder of the problem is fired from the Graphical Firing Table using the 100 Yard Scale and the C Scale. Procedure is to use the 100 Yard Scale to determine the deflection and charge, applying the number of miles shown for that range in the appropriate direction. Value of 100 yard range charge is read for that range last fired, and applied to the quadrant elevation in the proper direction.

This procedure has been found to increase the speed of firing an air observed mission, and the accuracy of fire remains as good as, or better than, the old method of plotting each correction on the chart, using the target grid and then measuring the deflection and range.

For missions where the Battalion is to mass on a target, the fire for effect data is replotted on the chart and data for the non-adjusting batteries read therefrom. Missing of fire has been entirely satisfactory.

The advantage of this method is that three air observed missions can be conducted by the computers simultaneously with the conduct of ground observer missions. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 89th Tank Bn

DATE:

December 1951

Source No 280

CLEARING FRIENDLY AIRMINE FIELDS WITH TANKS

Although Company "A" had been designated as the reserve company of the battalion, it was called upon almost daily to assist the

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Division Engineers in the clearing of friendly AP mine fields. This operation was accomplished by buttoning the hatches on the tanks committed to this detail and driving them through the mine fields using the same pattern that a farmer would employ while plowing a field. Although much was accomplished, the resultant damage to suspension systems was rather severe. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 35th Inf Regt

DATE: December 1951

Source No 281

NIGHT PATROLLING

Night reconnaissance patrols conducted during December usually had more positive results than daylight patrols and enemy contact was frequent. Because of imminent enemy contact and the long distances traveled, it was deemed necessary to include two (2) and sometimes three (3) reinforced squads in the tactical composition of night patrols. One or two squads served as the main body of the patrol while the remaining or "drop off" squads were deployed along the route to provide maximum protection for the main body of the patrol. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 5th RCT

DATE: November 1951

Source No 282

.50 CAL MG WITH SNIPER'S SIGHT

A .50 cal machine gun was used by this Regiment as a sniping weapon during this month's static situation. An eight power Marine Corps Optical Sniper's Sight was attached to a .50 cal machine gun by Division Ordnance. Very accurate sniping can be done up to ranges of 2000 yards. In one instance three Chinese were killed and three wounded at a range of 1600 yards. The .50 cal machine gun with this attachment is a very effective long-range sniping weapon and it is being used effectively in this Regiment. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 77th Field Arty Bn

DATE: August 1951

Source No 283

"WHY WE FIGHT" INDOCTRINATION

The indoctrination of newly arrived personnel as to "Why We Fight" should begin and be pursued with vigor while the individuals are still in the United States. If this were accomplished the men would arrive eager and willing to fight and would have a very positive and healthy attitude. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - EUSAK, Section I

DATE: July 1951

Source No 284

EMPTY GASOLINE DRUMS

The Japan Logistical Command reported that a Japanese barge carrying empty drums had exploded at KORE on 29 June, killing 6 persons and seriously injuring 3 others, and the barge was completely demolished. The cause of the explosion was traced to the fact that about 10% of the drums were without bungs and had not been washed with water. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - X Corps Artillery

DATE: July 1951

Source No 285

INTERCHANGE OF TIRES

It is recommended that the future design of the 8" Howitzer carriage and the wheeled ammunition carriers for this type unit be studied with the view of standardizing the wheel design on the carriages and trucks. Presently the tires for the 8" Howitzer are 1100-20 while those for the 7½-ton truck are 1200-24. These tires are so nearly the same size that a change to one or the other appears practicable and would allow an interchange between the two giving more flexibility and reducing supply difficulties. (RESTRICTED)

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ENEMY ARTILLERY

The enemy continued to make excellent use of camouflage and fortifications to hide the position of his artillery from friendly observation. Instances were noted where the enemy hid his artillery in caves or tunnels and ran the pieces outside to fire and then immediately pulled them back into the hiding place. In other instances prisoners reported that artillery was moved forward to a firing location after dark and then pulled back into concealment before daylight. In most cases, however, it is believed that the enemy artillery was fired from carefully selected and fortified positions with cover and concealment for both the smoke and the flash. It has been apparent this past month that the enemy has successfully developed relatively smokeless and flashless powder. The comparison between the amount of flash and smoke produced by American propelling charges compared to that produced by enemy weapons leaves much to be desired from our point of view. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE:

Command Report - 5th Inf Regt

DATE:

October 1951

Source No 286

BATTLE TRAINING

Prior to this 10-day offensive, the Regiment had engaged in no severe combat as a regiment since the end of May. During that period rotation caused a tremendous loss in battle experienced junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers. The two-month training period during August and September helped to alleviate this trouble. However, the Regiment was an inexperienced unit on 13 October. The 10-day offensive proved to be the perfect answer to this problem. The fighting was heavy, but casualties were moderate. The action was continuous, and required quick and efficient movements by motor and foot, day and night. Supply and evacuation was difficult but not impossible.

In summary, each commander and staff officer in all echelons, and every enlisted man got a thorough workout in his particular job.

Steady improvement was apparent through the operation. This proves, I believe, that our teachings and doctrines are sound, that our officers and enlisted replacements are well trained, that our Army can and will fight, when properly led, and can and will beat the Communist forces when and where encountered. (RESTRICTED)

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AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS

It is recommended that all Mosquitoes carry operational 300 radios for communication with ground units in the event the TACP radio goes out. It is realized that this is SCP, but very few of the Mosquitoes which worked with this regiment during the last operation were so equipped. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

DIVERSION OF PREARRANGED AIR STRIKES

On occasion, during the recent fighting, an air strike would be requested to reduce a strong Chinese position. The air strike would be approved, and planes dispatched for the mission. Success of the fight, in many instances, was hanging in the balance and would be directly influenced by the air strike. The FSOC working in conjunction with the Division Artillery and under the influence of G3 would divert the air strike to another locality which appeared to be under greater stress and in need of an air strike. This policy completely disrupts the continuity of the expecting units fire plan, and in my opinion prevented this unit from taking the objective at the minimum cost of time and men. Recommend that the diverting of an air strike be done only with the concurrence of the requesting commander. This will enable much more satisfactory use of effective tactical air power. The commander on the ground is in a better position to determine the need of an air strike and suitability of target than a person located at great range from the proximity of combat. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

EFFECT OF ARTILLERY ON CHINESE BUNKERS

Chinese bunkers for personnel and weapons are constructed with four layers of 8-10 inch logs and from one to three feet of dirt over the logs preventing any direct effect on personnel from the explosion of 105mm, 155mm, and 8 inch direct hits. Recommend that more 500 pound fragmentation bombs and napalm be made available for use against this type of installation. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

COUNTERBATTERY FIRE

While the Regiment was conducting the attack against a key terrain feature, six enemy 150 howitzers fired for a period of two hours without effective friendly counterbattery fire. It is felt that the

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absence of enemy mortar and artillery fire in previous operations has lured us away from practicing continuous counterbattery fire. Recommend that more attention be paid to placing friendly counterbattery fire on enemy guns in future operations. Improved use of available communications and coordinated air OPs will tend to remedy this situation. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

OFFICER QUALIFICATIONS

It is recommended that officers selected for overseas shipment as replacement officers be given additional training with troops to include actual command of Infantry companies and platoons. Many officers are received as Infantry unit commanders who have never commanded an Infantry unit during their entire commissioned service. Many have never served with the Infantry until selected for overseas shipment. In combat areas this creates a training hardship at the expense of enlisted personnel. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report -- 14th Inf Regt

DATE: September 1951

Source No 287

AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING FROM DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

Information of the enemy, his strength and dispositions, has not been gained by reconnaissance patrols using stealth and observation as commonly contemplated by accepted doctrine. Rather, it has been obtained by boldly attacking him in daylight to force him to reveal his positions.

Aggressive patrolling in a defensive position has paid high dividends. It retards the enemy's ability and willingness to probe our positions, keeps him continually alerted, weakens and destroys his positions, lowers his morale and costs him heavily in personnel. An increased burden is placed on his logistical problems, already taxed by harassment from artillery and air. Furthermore, it maintains a spirit of aggressiveness in a unit occupying a defensive position for an extended period of time. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Div Arty

DATE: October 1951

Source No 288

LOCATING ENEMY MORTARS

During the month of September 1951, the Division Artillery received two (2) countermortar radar sets with trained personnel. During the latter part of September, these sets began to produce excellent results. Enemy mortar locations were obtained using every available means. The following is a breakdown of confirmed enemy mortar locations and the sources or combination of sources employed.

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
Countermortar Radar	111	73.60%
Air OP (Ln Aircraft)	14	9.28%
Ground OP & FWS	6	3.97%
Photo Interpretation	4	2.65%
Inf Counterfire Platoon	3	1.98%
Photo Interpretation and FWS	2	1.32%
Air OP & Ground CP	2	1.32%
Ground OP	1	0.66%
TLO Agent (line crosser)	1	0.66%
Inf Patrol & Radar	1	0.66%
Photo Interpretation & Radar	1	0.66%
Ground OP & Photo Interpretation	1	0.66%

As a result of the intense countermortar program, the enemy was unable to use his mortars to any great extent against friendly attacking elements. Infantry unit commanders reported that they considered the program of great value and assistance to their units. Friendly casualties from mortar fire which up until this time had been high in comparison with casualties from other causes, now were comparatively low.

The only difficulty encountered was a shortage of spare parts for the countermortar radar sets. (SECRET)

SOURCE: Command Report - 76th AAA AW Bn (SP)

DATE: December 1951

Source No. 289

ROTATION AND REPLACEMENT

The net effect of rotation and replacement policies on units at the end of the line is that of the proverbial "whip cracker." Serious

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training problems are presented as the consequence of personnel conditions as outlined below for period 1 September - 31 December 1951:

- a. 427 enlisted men rotated.
- b. 472 enlisted men received as replacements.
- c. 418 replacements received have had no stateside training in MOS's related to Automatic Weapons.
- d. 411 of the 472 replacements received were in aptitude area groups IV and V. This represents approximately 87%. Under normal training conditions it is considered possible to absorb personnel in these groups up to about 30%. A total of 608 men out of approximately 760 men in this Battalion are in these lower groups. Following is a recapitulation covering distribution by area aptitude groups:

76th Bn		Normal	76th Bn
I - 0			
II - 29	--	526	154
III - 125			
IV - 507	--	236	603
V - 101			

EM without Aptitude Area I Score - 12

- e. 80% rotation of experienced NCO's.
- f. Only 16 NCO's have been received as replacements.
- g. Commitments of Battalion have not been reduced to allow for training in spite of influx of untrained AA personnel; AA Defense of three Air Bases at widely separated points in Korea has been the continued responsibility of this Battalion.
- h. Two Battalion S3's (Majors) were transferred to other units. A third officer (Major) was assigned and immediately sent to school inasmuch as he had had no recent AA experience.
- i. Of 12 officers received as replacements none of them have recent AA experience. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 139th FA Bn 45th Inf Div

DATE: December 1951

Source No. 290

QUALITY OF REPLACEMENTS

The caliber of replacements received by this organization continues to decline. The last group of replacements consisted of twenty-six (26) enlisted men. This group included ten (10) men with area I scores beneath seventy (70), five of whom had scores beneath sixty (60). I believe that this is much greater than the Army-wide percentage of the mentally slow. Four (4) of this group had not completed grade school and seven (7) more of them did not go to school beyond the eighth grade. The educational attainment of 42% of this group stopped at or before the 8th grade.

In spite of the short average length of service of this group, two of these enlisted men had records of previous court-martial convictions. One EM was a two time offender. One other EM was a confirmed dope addict and has since been hospitalized and transferred from this organization. Three more are suspected as users of drugs, and at a shakedown inspection still another man was found to have in his possession hypodermic needles and syringes. Four others have been subjects of official correspondence since their arrival at this organization. Three of the communications concerned absence without leave ranging from a few hours up to 5 days, and one concerned the alleged paternity of an illegitimate child.

An organization cannot continue to receive replacements comprised of more than the Army average of mentally and morally sub-standard personnel without having its efficiency seriously impaired. This group of men gives the appearance of having been carefully culled. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 50th AAA AW Bn (SP)

DATE: December 1951

Source No 291

EXCESSIVE VIBRATION ON M-16 SIGHTS

The new ring sight installed on the Multiple Gun Motor Carriage, M-16, is unsatisfactory due to excessive vibration during firing. This makes it extremely difficult for the gunner to keep the target in the

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selected speed ring throughout the course. Recommend that the pressed steel ring and rear peep sight elements be reinforced to eliminate this excessive vibration. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 153th FA Bn

DATE: December 1951

Source No 292

HIGH ANGLE FIRE

It is felt that more emphasis should be placed on high-angle shooting and meteorological fire direction procedures during training. We have discovered this type of fire to be as necessary in Korea as it was in the mountains of Italy in the adequate support of the front lines. It is reliable and safe; our observers, new as they are to this terrain and type of fire, have no difficulty in adjusting high-angle fire. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 39th Tank Bn

DATE: December 1951

Source No 293

BATTLEFIELD RECOVERY OF TANKS

During the recovery of one of the tanks a member of the recovery crew stepped on an antipersonnel mine that apparently was set to detonate an antitank mine. The resultant explosion caused two deaths and completely demolished a tow bar. The recovery tank, an M43 on which a towing pintle has been installed, sustained only minor damage and subsequently towed the damaged tank to safety. It is believed a standard VTR would have been severely damaged in the same circumstances with resultant confusion and loss of time in the recovery operation. This incident is only one in a long series proving the value of the above vehicle for battlefield recovery. It will not only withstand more physical punishment but will also outpull the M-32 in any type of terrain or weather. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE:	Command Report - 3d AAA AW Bn (SP)	
DATE:	December 1951	Source No 294

COMMUNICATIONS - DIVISION ARTILLERY

Units of Division Artillery, exclusive of this organization, utilize the 600 series radio for M communication. The present authorization for a divisional AAA Battalion is a 500 series radio. In that only a 1 MC overlap frequency exists between these radios, radio communication between the M and Div Arty is seriously restricted. When none of the overlap frequencies are available, the possibility of radio communication is completely eliminated.

To alleviate this situation and insure constant radio communication, it is recommended that two (2) SCR 628 radios be issued to the AAA AW Bn. One of the radios would be operated by the Battalion NCS and the other used by the CO.

Acquisition of these radios would not require any additional personnel. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Command Report - 64th Tank Bn (Medium)	
DATE:	December 1951	Source No 295

SCHOOLED TANK AND TURRET MECHANICS

Recommend that continued emphasis be placed on obtaining enlisted tank mechanics and turret mechanics who are graduates of the Armored School Enlisted Motor and Track Course. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Command Report - 3d Inf Div Arty	
DATE:	December 1951	Source No. 296

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

An inadequate supply of ammunition of one lot number still exists. If this supply problem were solved, the amount of range dispersion in firing on critical targets would be greatly reduced. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE:	Command Report - 65th Inf Regt, 3d Inf Div
DATE:	December 1951 Source No 297

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO REGIMENTS

It is recommended that each Infantry Regiment be assigned and have placed under its own control at least one liaison type aircraft and two (2) pilots. Even though the Division is assigned several of these aircraft which are available for use by the Regiments, often it is impossible to obtain an aircraft for much needed reconnaissance because of previous commitment of these aircraft to other units. This Regiment has found liaison type aircraft to be invaluable in the control of tactical operations and in making on-the-spot reconnaissance and it is felt that an organically assigned aircraft would obviate the possibility of one being unavailable to the Regiment when it is critically needed. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Command Report - X Corps
DATE:	October 1951 Source No 298

INE CLEARING

Excellent results were obtained by the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion in the use of sympathetic detonation to clear mined roads and trails by exploding several parallel rows of chain demolition blocks. Although the expenditure of explosives was high it was fully justified by the excellent results. It is recommended that prior planning for an operation include this additional explosive requirement. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE:	Command Report - 25th Div Arty
DATE:	November 1951 Source No 299

COUNTERMORTAR OPERATIONS

An urgent need exists to provide the artillery with more adequate means to locate enemy mortars. Time and again mortar shellings occur in sufficient number of rounds and within a short period of time, with

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no plots obtained due to poor radar equipment. A set with "tracking" characteristics as well as one which eliminates all clutter, detecting only objects in motion, is required. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Infantry Div

DATE: November 1951

Source No 300

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

During the period 99 prisoners of war were taken, 71 of whom stated that they were influenced to surrender by Division Psychological Warfare activities. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Inf Div

DATE: August 1951

Source No 301

MINE DETECTING AND REMOVAL

It is recommended that development of an adequate mine detecting and removal device be expedited. Detection must rely on some principle other than the presence of metal in the mine. The density of the earth in the vicinity of mines may be a possible approach, since holes must be dug to emplace the mines and the fill is usually more loosely packed than the natural ground. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * *

SNIPERS

Recommend that a stronger emphasis be placed on the importance of rifle marksmanship. The value of qualified snipers cannot be over emphasized, and the inability of the average soldier to engage enemy troops effectively at combat ranges is a serious handicap to successful operations. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE:

CG, I Corps

DATE:

23 January 1952

Source No 302

TACTICAL WIRE

The enemy hates our barbed wire. We are using anywhere from four to twelve bands of it in front of our positions, with the bands placed ten to twenty yards apart. A machine gun on defense is not complete without tactical wire. The two make a near perfect weapon. This slows up mass attacks so that artillery can really do some execution. (RESTRICTED)

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NIGHT OPERATIONS

Night operations should be stressed more than ever. The enemy at the present time has no wire or AP mines. Night moves against him should be used more. Frankly, our men don't like to move at night, but must be urged to do so. We should exploit the enemy's lack of barbed wire. (RESTRICTED)

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ATTACK THROUGH ENEMY GRENADES

The enemy, in defending, still occupies hill tops. When our attackers get within twenty or thirty yards of the top, the enemy habitually begins throwing hand grenades as fast as he can throw them. The inexperienced attacker will stop or turn back. I inquired of an experienced Platoon leader the other day how he got to the top when he led his Platoon against Hill 1487 last fall. He said that they had tried two days to take the hill, and each time were turned back by hand grenades. Finally, he took the hill by running or moving faster when they got within enemy grenade range. He stated by doing this many of the grenades rolled past them and exploded to the rear. (RESTRICTED)

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RIFLE GRENADES

In attacking steep hills it is necessary to lift our artillery fire when the men are a considerable distance from the top. It is then that the enemy has a chance to man his open fox holes on the top and get ready with his grenades. We have not used our rifle grenades enough against hill tops. When the artillery lifts, rifle grenades with air bursts should take over. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 58th FA Bn, 3d Inf Div

DATE: October 1951

Source No 303

COARSE POWDER BAG

In using dual grain powder, the firing batteries found that the coarse material of the powder bag was leaving residue in the powder chamber. This residue caused rounds to jam and the breach mechanism to function improperly. The gun sections improvised swabs for the powder chamber and learned to clean residue from the breach mechanism. This resulted in a decrease in the rate of fire.

It is recommended that a less coarse powder bag be used, with dual grain powder, for efficient burning. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - 15th FA Bn

DATE: December 1951

Source No 304

STANDARD FIRE DIRECTION CENTER

There is a need for a standard arrangement for the physical composition of an artillery battalion fire direction center. Every unit in Korea has its own ideal solution of the problem. If the Artillery School could work out, and demonstrate, a model FDC, it would result in an economy of equipment both signal and engineer, as well as a saving of personnel. It would then, of course, be necessary to change the T/O&E based upon the final solution as developed by Fort Sill. (RESTRICTED)

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FORWARD OBSERVERS

Tactical conditions in Korea have frequently made it necessary for artillery forward observers to adjust the fire of light and heavy mortars as well as tanks. Although there are no radical problems in adjusting any of these weapons, it would be advisable to include a brief period of instruction at the Artillery School on the characteristics of each. The increased knowledge gained would strengthen the infantry-artillery relationship. (RESTRICTED)

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CONVERSION FORMULA FOR HE AND WP SHELLS

The speed and accuracy of artillery adjustment would be improved if a satisfactory conversion formula could be devised to compensate for the different ballistical qualities of shell high explosive and shell white phosphorous. (RESTRICTED)

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FIRING TABLE FOR DUAL GRAIN POWDER

With the increasing availability of dual grain powders there is a corresponding need for a graphical firing table version of FT 105-H-4. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Inf Div

DATE: December 1951

Source No 305

COMBAT LESSON IN DEFENSE

This successful defense of an outpost against a numerically superior attacking force during the hours of darkness gave additional proof of the soundness of this Division's policy to hold ground at all costs, especially at night, and to withdraw only during daylight hours. The Commanding General has published and repeatedly emphasized to his subordinate commanders that night withdrawals result only in confusion and heavy casualties.

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The determination of the Turkish platoon leader to defend the outpost saved his men from the casualties they would have sustained trying to break through the enemy cordon in the dark. The planned fires of his riflemen and automatic weapons, supported by artillery and mortars from the IIR, inflicted extremely heavy casualties on the enemy.

The action further proved: (1) the importance of well planned mortar and artillery concentrations; and (2) the necessity for riflemen to hold their fire until the enemy is close to their positions. A search of the area surrounding the outpost on the day following the attack revealed that most of the enemy dead were killed as they attempted to move through areas covered by close-in protective fires. The others were killed by small arms and automatic weapons as they approached the protective wire. (RESTRICTED)

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PATROLS BETWEEN OUTPOST AND IIR

Another salient lesson in this action is the necessity for unity of command in attempting to clear enemy from the area between the outpost and the IIR. If the enemy is known to have infiltrated between the two (2) positions, one patrol under one commander, moving only from one direction, should be sent out. If more than one patrol goes out on a combat mission or to set up an ambush under separate commanders, confusion and disaster can be expected. Movement of the patrol must be coordinated with all units on the OPLR and the IIR. (RESTRICTED)

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VISITING PATROLS

Visiting patrols, normal in the organization of any outpost line of resistance, are indispensable against the Chinese in Korea. These patrols should operate between outpost positions and between outposts and the IIR. By moving through the low land between positions organized on key terrain, they provide early warning of enemy attempts at infiltration. Also, in case one position is hit by the enemy, one of these patrols can be used to reestablish contact or to go to the rescue of the position under attack. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE: Command Report - 24th Inf Div

DATE: October 1951

Source No 306

RIOT GUN

The riot type shot gun, used during the latter days of the month, appears to have a definite place in defensive fire plans. Particular attention must be given to the cleaning of the weapon, and it must be handled with care as it does not possess the sturdy construction of combat arms. Ammunition resupply presented no problem as the volume expended was comparatively small. It was noted that the brass cartridge shells, currently being issued for the weapon, are superior to paper cartridges in that they are not susceptible to moisture and do not require special handling to prevent roughage. As a defensive weapon the shot gun has the following qualifications:

1. Offers close-in protection for crew served weapons.
2. Proves effective in covering areas of approach which offer considerable concealment.
3. The mobility of the weapon makes it desirable as an ambush weapon especially during the periods of restricted visibility.
4. There are no indications that the shot gun will draw enemy fire to any greater extent than any other weapon, even though it has been used extensively at night when muzzle flash is easily discernible.
5. The shot gun has a definite advantage over the rifle and carbine at close range only. Shot dispersion gives good coverage over wide areas. Groups of two (2) to four (4) enemy have been killed or wounded by one shot at ranges of 50 to 60 feet.

It is believed that the riot gun has a definite place in the defensive fire plan, and can be utilized with success during all phases of close combat and in attacks during periods of restricted visibility. As the riot gun has not been used in an attack to date, a practical evaluation cannot be given. However due to the limited range of the weapon and the time required to reload it is believed that men equipped with shot guns would be at a distinct disadvantage.
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ARMORED CARRIAGE FOR QUAD .50 CAL WEAPONS

The antiaircraft halftrack, M-16, used almost exclusively as a ground support weapon in Korea, has emphasized the need for a vehicle that will furnish greater protection for the crew from mortar and artillery fire. In order to accomplish its mission the M-16 must take up an exposed firing position and the enemy immediately reacts with all available fire to eliminate this weapon. The M-16 is not particularly vulnerable to ground attack, due to its high rate of fire, but it is easily neutralized or destroyed by mortar and artillery fire. It is recommended that an all-armored vehicle, similar to the light tank, be developed as the carriage for the quadruple machine guns, .50 cal, for use in close support and that this weapon be made organic to the infantry regiment. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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ARMORED CAB FOR BULL-DOZERS

It is recommended that some type of armored cab be constructed for bull-dozers. At present, "dozer" operators working in close support of front line elements have virtually no protection from enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE: Command Report - 25th Inf Div

DATE: October 1951

Source No 307

CONNECTING TRENCHES

The digging of connecting trenches between positions on the MLR and from CP's, OP's, or other emplacements immediately in rear of front lines should be made standard practice. Without these trenches, friendly forces caught in intense artillery fires are unable to move without suffering heavy casualties. (RESTRICTED)

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HEAVY ARTILLERY VS ENEMY BUNKERS

It is recommended that a heavy artillery battery, preferably 8-inch howitzers, be made available to Division Artillery during operations in which the enemy habitually emplaces his artillery in heavy bunkers

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that can be destroyed only by precision adjustment with heavy artillery. Such a battery, attached to this Division for a limited period during October, was extremely effective in bunker destruction. (RESTRICTED)

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COUNTERMORTAR

A great need is felt for some device to locate mortar positions more accurately under conditions of terrain and weather encountered in Korea. Countermortar radar detachments are handicapped by obsolete and ineffective equipment and by excessive ground "clutter", caused by mountainous terrain. Counterfire platoons of the infantry regiments are likewise handicapped by the mountainous terrain. The enemy takes advantage of periods of poor visibility to fire artillery. At these times the only source of counterbattery information are counterfire platoons and radar.

In this connection, it is believed that more personnel should receive training in crater analysis. Crater analysis during October frequently furnished valuable information concerning caliber and azimuth of hostile guns. (RESTRICTED)

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ARTILLERY PROPELLANT CHARGES

The propelling charges used in 105-mm and 155-mm pieces produce an excessive amount of ash and smoke. The smoke discloses gun positions. It is believed that this is caused either by the dual grain powder or bags that seem to be treated with some sticky substance. Recommend that continued experiments be conducted to improve artillery propellants. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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BATTLE TRAINING

The Commanding General continued to stress the dangers of defense-mindedness and the necessity of aggressively seeking battle experience for all units through patrol and small task force activities. At a meeting with the Regimental commanders and tank battalion commander on 21 October he urged them, through training and planned battle experience, to develop well balanced fighting teams. (RESTRICTED)

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TACTICAL PRINCIPLES

During the tactical briefings held in the War Tent each night during the month, the Commanding General also emphasized these tactical principles:

1. Combat patrols should not consider that they have been in contact with the enemy until they hit resistance which is too strong for them. The mere observation of enemy personnel or emplacements does not constitute "contact." Only by aggressive action can the patrol hurt the enemy and gather information.
2. Patrol plans should be examined to make sure the patrol will serve some realistic purpose and not represent just another diagram on the map. The act of moving from friendly lines to a point within the enemy positions and back again has no particular value unless it has been decided ahead of time exactly for what purpose the patrol is going there.
3. Artillery and air preparation can serve the infantry better if it is extended over a period of days according to a sound plan. This increases the chances to get more hits and do more damage. Last minute fires, intense though they may be, never clear the way for the Doughboy, and he has to spend a large part of his time on the day of the attack waiting for his supporting arms to knock out unsuspected targets.
4. Air strikes and bombing runs should be requested in abundance. Because of the sharp ridges and deep valleys in Korea, it is almost impossible for one air strike or one bombing run to hit the target. However, out of several attempts, one is bound to do great damage.
5. In the attack, it is imperative to get behind the enemy and trap him. This saves fighting him twice. If he is allowed to get away to prepared positions farther north, two battles instead of one will have to be fought. (RESTRICTED)

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SOURCE:

Command Report - 73d Tank Bn

DATE:

December 1951

Source No 308

TANK LIMITATIONS

The combat and training requirements to which the M-46 tanks of this Battalion were subjected during December resulted in placing over half of our tanks on the deadline because of mechanical abuse inherent in meeting the tactical demands for use in rugged terrain. On divided slopes, tracks are thrown; on continuous climbing of steep grades, outpost shafts and final drives give out.

To alleviate this to some extent, the tank commander should be given as much latitude as possible in the selection of approaches and in determining grades which are too steep for the mechanical ability of the tank. Before ordering his tanks to perform a task which is mechanically ruinous, the task force commander or commander to whom tanks are assigned should carefully consider the risk involved in losing the tanks through mechanical failure--a loss which is as serious to the current mission as the loss of tanks from enemy fire. (CONFIDENTIAL)

NOTE: The above is a precis made from the original command report.

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